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Abstract: We analyse active space debris removal efforts from a strategic, game-theoretical perspective.1
Space debris are non-manoeuvrable, human-made objects orbiting Earth, which pose a significant threat to2
operational spacecraft. Active debris removal missions have been considered and investigated by different3
space agencies with the goal to protect valuable assets present in strategic orbital environments. An active4
debris removal mission is costly but has a positive effect for all satellites in the same orbital band. This leads5
to a dilemma: each agency is faced with the choice between the individually costly action of debris removal,6
which has a positive impact on all players; or wait and hope that others jump in and do the ‘dirty’ work. The7
risk of the latter action is that, if everyone waits the joint outcome will be catastrophic, leading to what in game8
theory is referred to as the ‘tragedy of the commons’. We introduce and thoroughly analyse this dilemma using9
empirical game theory and a space debris simulator. We consider two and three player settings and investigate10
the strategic properties and equilibria of the game, and find that the cost/benefit ratio of debris removal strongly11
affects the game dynamics.12
Keywords: Space Debris Removal, Empirical Game Theory, Tragedy Of the Commons, Strategic Substitutes13
1. Introduction14
In this work we apply empirical game theoretic methods to study the strategic real-world problem of15
space debris removal. The complexity of the space debris environment typically prohibits direct game theoretic16
analysis. However, by defining appropriate heuristic strategies and using a suitable simulator we can estimate17
heuristic payoff functions to model the strategic dilemma as a game. This then enables us to apply (evolutionary)18
game theoretic analysis.19
Since the late 1950s space agencies have launched many objects into Earth orbits with low or no incentive20
to remove them after their life span. Due to this, there are now many inactive objects orbiting Earth, which21
can pose a risk to active spacecraft. By far, the highest spatial density of such objects is in the Low Earth22
Orbit (LEO) environment, defined as the region of space around Earth with an altitude of 160 km to 2,000 km.23
The density of objects in LEO will most likely increase due to new launches, on-orbit explosions, and object24
collisions. NORAD tracks and catalogues objects in orbit, currently listing around 15,000 objects of 10cm225
and larger.1 However, it is estimated that the true number of objects is several orders of magnitude larger, with26
estimates of over 100,000 pieces of untracked debris of sizes 1-10cm2 [1]. At orbital speeds of approximately27
7.5 km/s such small pieces can cause considerable damage to active satellites.28
In recent years there have been several incidents producing a high number of debris. Two of them have29
been especially severe: (i) a 2007 Chinese anti-satellite missile test producing more than 1,200 catalogued30
pieces of debris, and an estimated 35,000 pieces of size 1cm and larger, resulting in the most severe orbital31
1 https://celestrak.com/NORAD/elements/
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debris cloud in history [2]; (ii) the collision of the Iridium-33 and Kosmos-2251 satellites in 2009, which was32
the first accidental hyper-velocity collision of two intact spacecraft [3]. More than 823 debris objects were33
catalogued forming two debris clouds in LEO. This incident introduced a high risk of potential collisions to34
many active objects in LEO. For example, the International Space Station (ISS) had to perform a manoeuvre in35
March 2011 to avoid a piece of debris from the 2009 Iridium-Kosmos collision [4].36
These two incidents show that space debris is a serious problem with potentially disastrous consequences.37
As a result, space agencies are now investigating ways in which end-of-life satellites can be safely de-orbited.38
However, measures that apply only to newly launched spacecraft may not be sufficient to prevent an exponential39
build-up of debris. Therefore, active space debris removal becomes relevant. An active debris removal mission40
has a positive effect (or risk reduction) for all satellites in the same orbital band. This leads to a dilemma: each41
agency has an incentive to delay its actions and wait for others to respond.42
We model this scenario as a non-cooperative game between self-interested agents in which the agents43
are space agencies. Using a high-fidelity simulator we estimate payoffs to agents for different combinations44
of actions taken, and analyse the resulting game in terms of best-response dynamics and (Nash) equilibria.45
Contrary to the urgency of the space debris dilemma there has not been much attention to this problem in46
scientific circles. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to consider this dilemma in the context of47
multi-agent strategic decision making using empirical game theoretic techniques.48
This paper proceeds as follows. We firstly position our study in the context of related work. Next,49
we present our space debris simulator which includes a collision model, a break-up model, and an orbital50
propagator. We then outline our game theoretic methodology. Using our simulator we analyze the potential51
impact of several removal strategies on the orbital environment, and present a game theoretic analysis.52
2. Related Work53
Our study can be placed in the context of two different areas of related work. Firstly, from a simulation54
modelling perspective various attempts have been made to accurately predict the evolution of space debris and55
the resulting risk of collisions for active space craft. Secondly, from a game theoretic perspective, researchers56
have utilized similar methods to study related problems of environmental pollution, and the shared exploitation57
of scarce resources [5].58
One of the earliest analyses of the projected evolution of space debris was done by Donald J. Kessler in59
1978 [6,7]. This study led to the definition of the “Kessler Syndrome”, a particular scenario where the density of60
objects in LEO becomes high enough to cause a cascade of collisions, each producing new debris and eventually61
saturating the environment, rendering future space missions virtually impossible. Follow-up studies have been62
published mostly by scientists from NASA, most well-known being the work of J.-C. Liou and Nicholas L.63
Johnson [8–10], in which the authors consider active removal strategies to mitigate the space debris problem.64
Liou and Johnson [8] present a sensitivity analysis of object removal strategies. They propose removing 5,65
10, or 20 objects per year, which can be seen as a single-agent approach. The authors compare these mitigation66
strategies with baselines “business as usual” or “no new launches” and show the effectiveness of object removals.67
The objects to be removed are chosen according to their mass and collision probability. We base our study on68
Liou and Johnson’s approach, but in contrast consider a multi-agent scenario in which different space agencies69
independently choose their removal strategy. In our model we implement individualised object removal criteria70
based on potential risk to important assets of each of the agents.71
The space debris removal dilemma is in many ways similar to other environmental clean-up efforts that72
have been studied using game theoretic tools in the past. For example, Tahvonen models carbon dioxide73
abatement as a differential game, taking into account both abatement costs and environmental damage [5].74
More complex models have been studied as well, including for example the ability to negotiate emission75
contracts [11]. Another related model is the Great Fish War of Levhari and Mirman [12]. Although not the same76
as environmental clean-up, this scenario deals with shared use of a scarce common resource, which potentially77
leads to the same dilemma in game theoretic terms, known as the “tragedy of the commons” [13]. However,78
each of these studies has focused solely on a (simplified) mathematical model of the underlying system. In79
contrast, we use a complex simulator to obtain an approximate model using empirical game theoretic methods.80
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Analysis of complex strategic interactions using game theoretic tools is often hindered by the large81
action-spaces available to the agents in such scenarios. For example, in the space debris removal dilemma, each82
possible piece of debris to remove is potentially an action. Additionally, it is often impossible to define payoffs83
to all (combinations of) actions in advance. This has led recently to the advent of empirical game theory [14,15].84
The main idea is to limit the strategy space of each agent by introducing high level generic profiles, or85
meta-strategies, that capture the main aspects of the interaction. Then, the payoff table for this reduced strategy86
space can be estimated empirically, either by analysing data from a real system, or by simulating a model of the87
system. Standard methods and techniques from (evolutionary) game theory can then be applied to the estimated88
payoff table, e.g. to find approximate equilibria [16].89
Such empirical game theoretic analysis has proven valuable in getting insights into various complex90
real-world domains, such as automated trading [17], auction mechanism design [18], the game of Poker [19],91
collision avoidance in multi-robot systems [20], adaptive cyber-defence strategies [21], and large-scale92
bargaining [22]. In this work we follow a similar approach but focus on the domain of space debris removal.93
3. Space Debris Simulation Model94
Our simulator is built on top of the Python scientific library PyKep [23], which provides basic tools for95
astrodynamics research such as satellite orbit propagators. To simulate the future development of space debris96
in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) we develop several sub-modules, including a collision model and a break-up model,97
which we describe below.98
The input data to our model comes from two satellite catalogues/databases: (i) the SATCAT2 database99
containing descriptions of all objects on earth orbits that have ever been documented, and (ii) the TLE100
(two-line element set)3 database providing up-to-date information on all active (not decayed) objects on earth101
orbits, including the orbital elements which uniquely identify an object’s orbit, and which are used for orbit102
propagation.103
3.1. Collision model104
To evaluate probability of collision between objects we follow the Cube approach [24]. The Cube approach
samples uniformly in time rather than space and is thus compatible with any orbital evolution simulation as it
does not impose assumptions on the orbital geometry. This is particularly important in LEO, where orbital
progression is significant in the considered time frame. We use the SGP4 [25] orbital propagator to calculate
the evolution of the ephemeris (i.e., position and velocity) of an orbiting object given its TLE description.
Ephemerides of all objects are calculated at regular time intervals. Space is then partitioned by a regular
3D-lattice and for any pair i, j of objects that fall into the same volume, the collision probability is evaluated as
follows:
pi,j = sisjVrelσU , (1)
where si = sj are the spatial densities of object i and j in the cube, σ = pi(ri + rj)2 is the cross-sectional105
collision area, Vrel is the collision (relative) velocity of the two objects, and U is the volume of the cube.106
For each pair, a pseudo-random number x is generated from a uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1); if107
pi,j > x, a collision event is triggered.108
3.2. Breakup model109
We use NASA’s standard breakup model [26] to generate the population of fragments resulting from a110
collision event. The NASA/JSC breakup model represents a widely accepted understanding of the fragmentation111
process of in-orbit collisions and explosions based on multiple ground-tests and radar observations of past112
events.113
2 https://celestrak.com
3 https://www.space-track.org/
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Figure 1. Orbital inclination distribution
The model provides distributions for size, mass and ejection velocity of the fragment population114
parametrised by total mass and collision velocity of the parent objects. The number of fragments larger115
than a characteristic length-scale follows a power-law, the area-to-mass ratio follows a multivariate normal116
distributions, and the ejection velocity is sampled from a log-normal distribution. For details we refer the reader117
to the original paper [26] as well as the description of the model in [27]. For each sampled fragment, we create118
a new TLE entry and add it to the population of objects being propagated by SGP4.119
Although the breakup model covers also explosions as well as non-catastrophic collisions, we only120
consider catastrophic collisions (i.e., leading to complete disintegration) in this work.121
3.3. Repeating launch sequence122
To simulate future launches of new satellites we assume a “business as usual” scenario based on past data.123
One can assume that future launches will differ to past launches by many factors, e.g. the mission purpose, the124
number of launches, their success rate and technology level, and the satellite’s ability to decay in given time125
frame, etc. However, as a first step simplification we base our model on repeating a 10 year window from 2005126
to 2015. From the SATCAT catalogue we filter all space objects introduced in this time window, excluding127
debris. For all these objects (both decayed and not decayed) we store the TLE data (for the decayed objects128
we store the last TLE recorded). We then repeat this 10 year launch sequence and introduce each month all129
the objects that were launched exactly (a multiple of) ten years ago. We keep all the orbital elements the same,130
except for the inclination, which we sample randomly from the distribution of inclinations of all objects in the131
repeated sequence. This way, newly launched satellites will have slightly different orbits, as can be expected.132
Figure 1 shows the distribution of orbital inclinations. We can see that the highest number of objects has133
an inclination of around 95°.134
We assume an increase over time in the number of launches due to technological development and135
changing needs. In addition to the 10 year repeating sequence, we increase the number of launches by 0.5%136
each year, by randomly sampling from the 10 year sequence. Note that each launch has a small probability of137
failing, due to the instability of some orbits resulting from the randomly sampled orbital inclination. Thus, some138
objects decay very soon after being launched, which can be thought of as e.g. unsuccessful launches, break-up139
during first stage, etc.140
3.4. Validation141
In order to validate our model we simulate the evolution of the total number of debris and compute the142
resulting spatial density in different altitude ranges for the next 150 years, and compare our predictions to those143
of Liou and Johnson [8]. In Figure 2 we show our prediction of spatial density in LEO, assuming no mitigation144
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Figure 2. Spatial density prediction in LEO
strategies. The three curves represent current situation (the year 2015), and predictions for the years 2115 and145
2165. One can observe that the highest spatial density is in the region around 789 km of altitude, which was146
caused by the Iridium-Kosmos collision. The second peak around 865 km results from the Chinese anti-satellite147
missile test causing Fengyun-1C breakup. In our prediction, the spatial density increases significantly over time148
due to new collisions. These findings are in line with those reported by Liou and Johnson [8].149
4. Game Methodology150
Game theory models strategic interactions in the form of games. The most basic type are normal-form151
games, in which n players each have a set of actions to choose from. Without prior communication, each player152
selects an action, and the combination of actions by all player (the joint action) determines the payoff to each.153
Players are assumed to be rational, i.e. they will always want to play a best response (in terms of individual154
payoff) to the joint action of all remaining players. A joint action in which each action is a best response to all155
other actions is called a Nash equilibrium (NE).4156
The space debris removal dilemma can be modelled as a game in which the players are space agencies,157
their actions are debris removal strategies, and the payoffs are derived from removal costs as well as collision158
risks. The strategic interaction results from the fact that debris removal by one agency may affect the collision159
risks to others as well.160
Players — Our main analysis focuses on a two-player game: (1) the United States (US) represented by161
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and (2) the European Union (EU) represented by162
European Space Agency (ESA) and all EU member states. Additionally we consider adding China (CN) as a163
third player. The fourth major space agency, Russia (Roscosmos), is not included in our game, but does play a164
role in the simulator in terms of repeating past launch sequences.165
Important Assets — For each player we store a list of important assets. Important assets are all active166
objects owned by that player which are not debris, and which have been launched in the last 10 years (we assume167
a 10 year life span of satellites). The list of important assets is continuously updated during the simulation.168
Figure 3 shows an example of the development of important assets for each of the agencies. One can observe169
that a small difference in the number of important assets at the beginning causes a big difference at the end of the170
projection due to the repetition of launches from the same sequence, combined with the 0.5% yearly increase.171
Actions — The players’ actions are defined by the number of debris objects that will be removed each172
year. In our game, the players can remove 0, 1, or 2 risky objects every 2 years. We assume self-interested173
4 For an introduction to game theory see [28].
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agents, meaning that each player first removes objects which directly threaten their important assets, and then174
removes objects which may potentially collide in general. The reasoning for the latter is that debris resulting175
from any collision may pose a potential future risk to a player’s important assets. Therefore, removing any risky176
debris object (not only those that threaten important assets) may benefit all the players to some extent. Each177
agency decides on their strategy at the beginning of the game, and does not change it later. Thus, we model this178
as a one-shot normal form game. Moreover, we assume that removal actions are always successful.179
Risks and Payoffs — During simulation we keep track of the risk of collision (pij in Equation 1) to each180
player’s important assets. The total sum of these risks over the full time horizon is taken as the overall risk r to181
each player under the simulated scenario. Subsequently, we derive payoffs from the costs of losing important182
assets, and the costs of object removal. These payoffs are computed by multiplying the player’s overall risk r by183
the associated cost of loosing an asset Cl , and adding the cost of removing one object each year Cr multiplied184
by the number of removed objects and the time horizon T. Specifically, Table 1 lists the payoff functions185
that are used given the player’s strategy. Note that we assume that costs linearly increase with the risk, which186
intuitively makes sense from a purely monetary perspective, where each lost asset costs the same amount to187
replace. However, other cost function could be constructed to incorporate for example loss aversion. Finally,188
since the term r · Cl is common to each strategy, we can assume without loss of generality that Cl = 1 (in189
arbitrary units) and focus only on the ratio Cr/Cl = Cr in the remainder.190
Table 1. Payoff functions for the different strategies.
Strategy Payoff function
Remove 2 −(r · Cl + T · Cr)
Remove 1 −(r · Cl + 0.5 · T · Cr)
Remove 0 −(r · Cl)
5. Simulation Results and Projections191
We use our simulator to project the evolution of debris and collision risks with a time horizon of 150 years,192
i.e. the period 2016-2165, while repeating the launch history of 2006-2015 with a 0.5% yearly increase. We193
first focus on a 2-player 3-action game, with players US and EU, and the actions to remove 0, 1, or 2 objects194
every two years as described above. For each combination of actions we average over 160 Monte-Carlo runs195
to account for randomness in the collision and break-up modules. Error margins are omitted in the figures for196
readability, but are reported below in Table 2.197
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Figure 4. Debris evolution for next 150 years
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Figure 5. Evolution of overall risk to important assets for different combinations of actions of both US and EU.
5.1. Debris evolution198
Figure 4 shows the evolution of objects in LEO for different combinations of strategies taken by the US and199
the EU. We observe an exponential growth trend without mitigation, in line with findings previously reported200
by Liou and Johnson [8]. One can clearly see that removing risky objects has a positive effect as it leads to a201
much lower total number of objects in LEO. Note that when both players remove 2 objects every two years, this202
means that in total 300 objects are actively removed over the course of 150 years. In contrast, this leads to a203
reduction in total number of objects in LEO of over 60,000, due to a strong decrease in number of collisions and204
resulting debris. Also note that the total number of active satellites in each scenario is less than 1,500 (see 3), a205
small fraction of the total number of objects.206
5.2. Risk evolution207
We now look at the potential risks to the agencies’ important assets, as described in Section 4, that result208
from the debris evolution in LEO. Figure 5a shows the evolution of the expected overall risk to the US. One can209
observe that if the EU removes objects it helps US as well. However, objects removed by the US have greater210
impact on their overall risk, which is explained by the fact that each agency removes firstly the objects that211
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Figure 6. Free-riding effect in the overall risk to important assets for non-active players China and Russia, for
combinations of actions of both US and EU.
threaten their important assets directly, and only then they remove objects that pose a risk in general. Therefore,212
we can see that the joint action {US 1, EU 0} helps the US substantially more than {US 0, EU 2}, even though213
in the latter case more objects are removed in total.214
In Figure 5b we can see the expected overall risk of losing important assets for the EU. We observe similar215
trends as in the previous figure: the EU is better off when they remove objects that directly threaten their assets.216
However, even when the EU removes nothing but the US does, the EU risks decrease. This means that, as217
expected, there is in fact a dilemma as each agency benefits from mitigation efforts of others, without having to218
pay a cost (free-riding).219
The free-riding effect can be observed as well when looking at the risk evolution for both China and Russia.220
Even though these agencies did not take part in mitigation in our scenario (essentially playing the fixed action221
of remove 0), they still benefit from a reduced risk to their important assets. Figure 6a shows this for the case of222
China, and similar results are observed in Figure 6b for Russia. One can notice an abrupt increase in the Chinese223
risks around the year 2080, which is eliminated when more objects are removed in total. The joint efforts of the224
US and the EU in fact remove the one object which causes this high risk to the Chinese important assets.225
6. Game Theoretic Analysis226
We now turn to the game theoretic analysis of the space debris removal dilemma. First, we use the227
results reported in Section 5 to derive a normal-form game representation of the two-player scenario. We228
then thoroughly analyse this game. Finally, we give an example of a three-player game.229
6.1. Two player game230
Using the simulation results of Section 5, we can now construct a normal-form game representation of the231
two-player space debris removal dilemma. First, we construct a risk matrix, showing the overall risks to the232
two players (US and EU) for each combination of actions. Then, we use this risk table together with the cost233
functions defined in Table 1 to derive payoff matrices for different removal costs Cr, and analyse all possible234
Nash equilibria outcomes.235
Table 2 shows the average cumulative risks accrued by both players, taken from the results in Figures 5a236
and 5b (time horizon 150 years, 160 runs for each scenario). A cumulative risk of 0.36385 for the EU in the237
no removal case can be interpreted as an expected loss of 0.36385 assets in total for the EU. The lower part of238
Table 2 shows the 95% confidence intervals for these averages. Clearly, when no removal costs are taken into239
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Table 2. Risk matrix for both players for each combination of strategies. The risks are the average cumulative
risk of losing an asset over the course of 150 years. We show 95 % confidence intervals in the lower table.
EU 2 EU 1 EU 0
US 2 0.03413, 0.03733 0.05247, 0.07108 0.07704, 0.27474
US 1 0.06073, 0.06352 0.09499, 0.10405 0.10885, 0.31401
US 0 0.25022, 0.07368 0.28848, 0.12447 0.34261, 0.36385
US 2 ±0.00528,±0.00563 ±0.00712,±0.00785 ±0.00838,±0.01874
US 1 ±0.00689,±0.00767 ±0.00820,±0.00938 ±0.00994,±0.01954
US 0 ±0.01896,±0.00786 ±0.01685,±0.01061 ±0.01831,±0.01859
Table 3. Payoff matrix for both players for each combination of strategies for Cr = 0.003.
EU 2 EU 1 EU 0
US 2 −0.48413,−0.48733 −0.50247,−0.29608 −0.52704,−0.27474
US 1 −0.28573,−0.51352 −0.31999,−0.32905 −0.33385,−0.31401
US 0 −0.25022,−0.52368 −0.28848,−0.34947 −0.34261,−0.36385
account, it is in the best interest of each player to remove as many debris as possible. However, one should240
assume non-zero removal costs. Using the cost functions of Table 1 we can transform the risk matrix into a241
payoff matrix for any given cost Cr. Table 3 shows an example payoff matrix for cost Cr = 0.003 (in arbitrary242
units, see Section 4). The player’s best responses as indicated in bold. One can see that there are two pure Nash243
equilibria in this scenario, {US 0, EU 1} and {US 1, EU 0}. Moreover there is one mixed equilibrium at where244
US and EU mix between removing 1 and 0 with probability (0.488, 0.512) and (0.218, 0.782), respectively.245
Different choices for Cr lead to different games in terms of best-responses and Nash equilibria. We can246
identify two interesting regions in the range of costs Cr. For very low costs, removing 0 will never be a best247
response for either player. Similarly, for high costs, removing 2 will never be a best response. Therefore we can248
focus on two sub-games defined by the action-pairs {0, 1} and {1, 2}.249
We compute Nash equilibria for a range of Cr for the sub-game {0, 1} and visualise the results in Figure 7.250
The x-axis shows the cost of removal Cr. Each value of Cr corresponds to a specific set of Nash equilibria,251
which are indicated by the coloured lines. The y-axis indicates the (mixed) actions by both players that make252
up the equilibrium, given as the probability with which each player (US – top graph; and EU – bottom graph)253
chooses the action remove 0. This equals 1 minus the probability of remove 1 in the two-action sub-game. For254
example, the solid red line indicates that for Cr / 0.0026 there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in which both255
players remove 1 object (the probability of not removing is 0). Similarly, the dashed black line indicates a mixed256
Nash equilibrium in the range 0.0028 / Cr / 0.0031, the location of which changes linearly with Cr. The257
Nash equilibria for the sub-game {1, 2} are likewise visualised in Figure 8.258
In both figures we see interesting transitions from the single Nash equilibrium at (0, 0), to a situation where259
three equilibria exist at (0, 1), (1, 0) and one mixed, and finally back to a single pure equilibrium at (1, 1).260
These transitions phases also include a stage in which only one of the asymmetric pure equilibria at (1, 0) or261
(0, 1) exists. The existence of these asymmetric equilibria is interesting, and results from the asymmetry that is262
inherent in the risk matrix due to agencies having different numbers of assets and in different orbits.263
6.2. Strategic substitutes and existence of pure equilibrium264
In games we construct in this paper are finite strategic-form games. The celebrated result of Nash [29]265
shows that every finite game possesses at least one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. While mixing makes a266
lot of sense in some settings, e.g., zero-sum games like poker and sports matches, in other settings pure strategy267
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Figure 7. Equilibrium strategies for the sub-game {remove 0, remove 1} for a range of removal costs Cr.
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equilibria are more compelling. In this section we discuss properties, relevant for the games we construct, that268
guarantees the existence of pure equilibria.269
In general, active debris removal has a positive effect not only for the instigator of the removal but also270
for other players, and this is the cause of the dilemma that we are studying. In game-theoretic terminology, this271
suggests that we have games with a weak strategic substitutes property. The most well-known economic game272
with this property is Cournot oligopoly [30,31]. First we formally define the property.273
Our exposition is based on [32], but, for simplicity, is specialized to the setting of finite pure strategy sets.274
Denote the set of players by N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each player i ∈ N has a finite pure strategy set Si that is a275
subset of non-negative real numbers, i.e., Si ⊂ R≥0. In our space debris removal games, Si can be thought276
of as the set of choices of how much debris player i removes, so in Table 1, the three strategies remove 0,277
remove 1, remove 2 would correspond to Si = {0, 1, 2}. Let S denote the set of all pure strategy profiles, i.e.,278
S := S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn. Denote the payoff function of player i by pii : S→ R.279
For the purpose of stating known results on the existence of pure equilibria, we are going to assume that
the payoff of player i depends only on his choice and the aggregate (i.e., sum) of the strategy choices of the
other players. Formally, for any pure strategy profile s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ S, we denote by s¯−i the additive
aggregate of other players strategies, i.e.,
s¯−i = ∑
j∈N\{i}
sj .
Then we write our restricted payoff function as pii(si, s¯−i). For any choice s−i ∈ ∏j∈N\{i} Sj, the set βi(s¯−i)
of best responses of player i is given by
βi(s¯−i) = arg max
t∈Si
pii(t, s¯−i) .
Recall that s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ S is a (pure) Nash equilibrium if
si ∈ βi(s¯−i)
for all i ∈ N. For a given player i ∈ N, we denote by S¯−i the set of all possible values of s¯−i, the additive280
aggregate of other players’ strategies, i.e., S¯−i = {s¯−i | s ∈ S}. We say that a game like this has the weak281
strategic substitutes property if there exists a function bi : S¯−i for these games with restricted payoffs functions282
such that:283
• bi(x) ∈ βi(x) for all x ∈ S¯−i, [bi selects a best response for i]284
• bi(x) ≤ bi(y) whenever x > y. [bi does not increase in s¯−i]285
Such a game with the weak strategic substitutes property, and where payoffs depend only on one’s own strategy286
and the sum of others’ strategy, are known to always possess at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium, which287
is shown via a potential-function type argument [32–34].288
Notice that the weak strategic substitutes property can be defined as above even without the restriction that289
the payoffs are of the form pii(si, s¯−i) for player i. However, in that case a pure equilibrium may not always290
exist. The games that we construct comprise payoffs that arise from (noisy) simulations and thus do not satisfy291
the restricted payoff form. However, the games we construct do either have the weak strategic substitutes292
property, or their violation of it is not statistically significant. Thus it is an interesting future direction to293
see if we can fit restricted payoff functions to closely approximate the empirical payoffs that arise from our294
simulations. We discuss this further below, where we also discuss slightly more general aggregation functions295
for defining restricted payoff functions that, along with the weak substitutes property, guarantee the existence296
of pure equilibria. First though we note that when considering only two players, the restriction of the payoff297
functions is without loss of generality, and so we have the following.298
Observation 1. Any two-player game that has the weak strategic substitutes property admits a pure equilibrium.299
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For example, in Table 3, we can see that this game has the weak strategic substitutes property since, as the300
EU removes more (going from 0 to 1 to 2), the best responses of the US (as indicated by the boxes in Table 3301
is to weakly remove less (going from 1 to 0 to 0, respectively), and similarly for the best responses of the EU302
as US changes pure strategy. This game has two pure equilibria (US 0, EU 1) and (US 1, EU 0) and one mixed303
equilibrium as one can also see in Figure 7.304
As mentioned above, for games with the weak strategic substitutes property, the existence of pure equilibria305
is known for a wider class of games than just those where the payoff of i depends on his strategy and the sum306
of the others’. This aggregation of players’ strategies done by s¯−i can in fact be an arbitrary linear combination307
rather than just a sum, and further can include linear combinations of products of strategies too; for full details308
see [35]. Thus there is actually a lot of scope to fit payoff functions that meet these criteria for existence of a309
pure equilibrium due to strategic substitution and also are consistent with the payoff estimates that arise from310
our simulations. We leave this as an interesting direction for further work.311
6.3. Evolutionary dynamics312
Another way to study the strategic properties of a game is by looking at the corresponding evolutionary
dynamics. Evolutionary game theory5 represents a player’s strategy by a population of individuals, each of a
certain type which corresponds to one of the player’s possible actions. The fraction of the population belonging
to each type indicates the probability with which the player will play the corresponding pure action. The
replicator dynamics dictate how the fraction xi of each type i in the population x changes over time due to
evolutionary pressure:
x˙i = xi[ fi(x)− f¯ (x)]
where fi(x) is the fitness (expected payoff) to type (action) i in the population, and f¯ (x) is the weighted average313
fitness of the whole population. Under the replicator dynamics, types that do better than average will increase314
in abundance, whereas types that do worse will decline.315
Figure 9 shows the directional field of the replicator dynamics for the sub-game {remove 0, remove 1}316
for different values of Cr corresponding to the different sets of equilibria observed in Figure 7. The axes show317
the probability with which both players play the action “remove 0” (US 0 and EU 0). The arrows indicate318
the direction and magnitude of change. The replicator dynamics give insight into the stability of the different319
equilibria and their corresponding basins of attraction. We can conclude that the mixed Nash equilibria in panels320
(c) and (d) are unstable, as a small perturbation will cause the population to move towards one of the stable pure321
equilibria. Moreover we can see that the basin of attraction for the pure equilibrium {US 0, EU 1} (bottom right322
corner) is larger than for {US 1, EU 0} indicating that this equilibrium is more likely to arise when both players323
iteratively optimise their strategy. This is of particular interest when full knowledge of the game is not available324
and the players need to learn by interacting, e.g. when space agencies mutually adapt their policy based on325
an estimate of other agencies’ policies. In fact, the replicator dynamics are descriptive of various multi-agent326
learning processes, and as such studying these dynamics provides valuable insights in the context of adaptive327
agents as well [37].328
Figure 10 shows similar results for the sub-game {remove 1, remove 2}, corresponding to the different329
sets of equilibria observed in Figure 8. Again we observe the instability of mixed equilibria, and the differently330
sized basins of attraction showing asymmetry in the game’s payoff structure.331
6.4. Three player game332
So far we have only considered two active players. Here, we take a first step in analysing a larger game333
between three players (agencies): the US, the EU, and China (CN). We focus on the two-action sub-game334
{remove 0, remove 1} only to facilitate analysis. Table 4 shows the cumulative risks for all three players,335
averaged over 180 Monte Carlo runs, as well as the corresponding confidence intervals. The risks for each336
5 See [36] for an introduction.
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Figure 9. Evolutionary dynamics of the sub-game {remove 0, remove 1} for different values of Cr. Stable
attractors are indicated with and unstable attractors with . The dotted line indicates the trajectory on which
the mixed equilibrium moves as Cr changes.
player are distinguished by different font styles. We can see that the risks for China are considerably higher337
than for the US or the EU, even though their total number of important assets is lower (see Figure 3). This338
interesting result may be due to the specific orbits used by each of the player, some being more dense in terms339
of debris than others, which requires further investigation.340
We can again convert the risk matrix into a payoff matrix using the payoff functions defined in Table 1.341
In Figure 11 we visualise the Nash equilibria for varying costs of removal Cr. At the left part of the figure the342
cost of removal is low, and therefore it is in the best interest of all three players to remove debris. However,343
for increasing costs it becomes a best response for the US to stop removing, and there exists a pure equilibrium344
(US 0, EU 1, CN 1). The reason that the US opts out first is due to their lower overall risk compared to the two345
other players. In contrast, the higher risks to China mean it is in their interest to keep removing, even when both346
US and EU have opted out. When the cost rises even further (the right side of the figure), we see that for none347
of the players removing is viable.348
Although for most removal costs Cr the strategic substitute property discussed previously holds, there is349
a range of costs for which the property is violated. However, the payoff differences leading to this violation350
are not statistically significant and may be resolved by increasing the number of Monte Carlo samples of our351
simulation, which is left for the future work.352
7. Conclusion and Future Work353
In this paper we have presented a new approach to study space debris removal, by introducing a354
multi-player non-cooperative game named the Space Debris Removal Dilemma. We implemented a realistic355
model of earth orbit environment, where we projected new future launches, collisions of space objects and356
natural decay for the next 150 years, for different debris removal strategies. Our experiments confirmed the357
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Figure 10. Evolutionary dynamics of the subgame {Remove 1, Remove 2} for different values of Cr. Stable
attractors are indicated with and unstable attractors with . The dotted line indicates the trajectory on which
the mixed equilibrium moves as Cr changes.
Table 4. Risk matrix (top) and corresponding 95% confidence intervals (bottom) for a three-player two-action
game. Players are US, EU and China, the font type shows risk values belonging to each player.
EU 1 EU 0
CN 1
US 1 0.07013, 0.08621, 0.10162 0.09185, 0.31547, 0.13320
US 0 0.27373, 0.10294, 0.12226 0.30759, 0.33980, 0.15468
CN 0
US 1 0.09229, 0.10067, 0.38774 0.11226, 0.32031, 0.43121
US 0 0.28510, 0.12539, 0.43225 0.34400, 0.36335, 0.49774
EU 1 EU 0
CN 1
US 1 ±0.0061,±0.0074,±0.0086 ±0.0071,±0.0174,±0.0103
US 0 ±0.0163,±0.0080,±0.0098 ±0.0184,±0.0189,±0.0110
CN 0
US 1 ±0.0077,±0.0087,±0.0255 ±0.0093,±0.0183,±0.0260
US 0 ±0.0157,±0.0099,±0.0275 ±0.0181,±0.0180,±0.0279
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Figure 11. US, EU and China equilibria for different costs of removal
commonly predicted exponential growth of space debris in near earth orbits. This is an important motivation to358
come up with mitigation strategies such as active object removal.359
In our game-theoretical analysis of this game we identified Nash equilibria for different levels of cost of360
removals; although the costs of active debris removal are still prohibitively high at the moment they are expected361
to decrease with future technological development. Additionally, we investigated the strategic substitute362
property that appears in this type of game scenario, and which guarantees existence of a pure equilibrium under363
certain conditions. Although a mixed equilibrium exists for some costs as well, it is often more desirable to focus364
on pure equilibria. Specifically, in our scenario, it cannot be expected that space agencies will randomize over365
pure strategies to decide on their space debris removal policy. Another disadvantage of a mixed equilibrium366
in this game is its instability (as shown in Figure 9), which is undesirable in our scenario, where the choice367
of action taken has a huge impact on the earth orbit environment. The results of this study help agencies to368
better understand the debris removal problem and its short and long term consequences, in order to prepare369
for mitigation strategies. For instance, we show that removing just one high risk debris object every two years370
can already substantially decrease the risk of collision for active satellites. Additionally, removal of indirect371
collision risks is beneficial as well as it reduces the number of potential future on-orbit collisions.372
There are many routes for future work. Projecting the future evolution of space debris itself is a very373
complex problem with many unknown variables and inputs, and therefore some necessary simplifications and374
assumptions have been made. Despite these simplifications the simulation is computationally demanding, which375
makes it difficult to obtain the necessary number of Monte Carlo runs, especially for larger games. In future376
work we aim to use HPC clusters to obtain statistically significant results for more extensive scenarios, in377
which we can include more players (e.g. Russia, India) as well as more diverse debris removal strategies. For378
example, different types of removal missions may come with different associated cost and success rates, which379
could further enrich the strategic aspects of the model.380
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From a game-theoretic point of view, our approach has been limited to a one-shot normal-form game,381
which assumes that agencies fix their removal policy for the entire time horizon up front. More realistically,382
these strategies may be adaptive and dependent on the state of the LEO environment as well as on current and383
past actions by others. One possible future direction is to move to the framework of stochastic or dynamic384
games. Finally, the strategic substitutes property can be further investigated, for example by attempting to fit a385
parametrised game to the empirical results. If successful, this would greatly reduce the computational burden386
of running a variety of similar experiments.387
Acknowledgments: This work was supported by the European Space Agency under the Ariadna initiative, study reference388
no. 15/8401.389
Author Contributions: All authors contributed equally to the conception and design of the experiments; R.K. performed390
the experiments and analysed the data; D.B., R.S. and K.T. contributed to the game theoretic analysis; D.H. and D.I. provided391
input on space debris and active debris removal; R.K. and D.B. wrote the paper.392
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.393
Bibliography394
1. Carrico, T.; Carrico, J.; Policastri, L.; Loucks, M. Investigating orbital debris events using numerical methods with395
full force model orbit propagation. Advances in the Astronautical Sciences 2008, 130, 407–426.396
2. Office, N.O.D.P. Chinese Anti-satellite Test Creates Most Severe Orbital Debris Cloud in History. Orbital Debris397
Quaterly News 11 (2) April 2007.398
3. Office, N.O.D.P. Satellite Collision Leaves Significant Debris Clouds. Orbital Debris Quaterly News 13 (2) April399
2009.400
4. Office, N.O.D.P. International Space Station Again Dodges Debris. Orbital Debris Quaterly News 15 (3) July 2011.401
5. Tahvonen, O. Carbon dioxide abatement as a differential game. European Journal of Political Economy 1994,402
10, 685 – 705.403
6. Kessler, D.J.; Cour-Palais, B.G. Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt. Journal404
of Geophysical Research 1978.405
7. Kessler, D.J.; Johnson, N.L.; Liou, J.C.; Matney, M. The Kessler syndrome: Implications to future space operations.406
American Astronautical Society - Guidance and Control Conference 2010.407
8. Liou, J.C.; Johnson, N., L. A sensitivity study of the effectiveness of active debris removal in LEO. Acta Astronautica408
2009, 64, 236–243.409
9. Liou, J.C.; Johnson, N., L.; Hill, N. Controlling the growth of future LEO debris populations with active debris410
removal. Acta Astronautica 2010, 66, 648–653.411
10. Liou, J.C. An active debris removal parametric study for LEO environment remediation. Advances in Space412
Research 2011, 47, 1865–1876.413
11. Harstad, B. Climate Contracts: A Game of Emissions, Investments, Negotiations, and Renegotiations. The Review414
of Economic Studies 2012, 79, 1527–1557.415
12. Levhari, D.; Mirman, L.J. The great fish war: an example using a dynamic Cournot-Nash solution. The Bell Journal416
of Economics 1980, pp. 322–334.417
13. Hardin, G. The tragedy of the commons. science 1968, 162, 1243–1248.418
14. Walsh, W.; Das, R.; Tesauro, G.; Kephart, J. Analyzing complex strategic interactions in multi-agent systems.419
AAAI-02 Workshop on Game-Theoretic and Decision-Theoretic Agents, 2002.420
15. Wellman, M.P. Methods for empirical game-theoretic analysis. Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial421
Intelligence. Menlo Park, CA; Cambridge, MA; London; AAAI Press; MIT Press; 1999, 2006, Vol. 21, pp.422
1552–1555.423
16. Jordan, P.R.; Vorobeychik, Y.; Wellman, M.P. Searching for approximate equilibria in empirical games. Proceedings424
of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems-Volume 2. International425
Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2008, pp. 1063–1070.426
17. Wellman, M.P.; Jordan, P.R.; Kiekintveld, C.; Miller, J.; Reeves, D.M. Empirical game-theoretic analysis of the427
TAC market games. AAMAS-06 Workshop on Game-Theoretic and Decision-Theoretic Agents, 2006.428
18. Phelps, S.; Parsons, S.; McBurney, P. An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Comparison of Two Double-Auction Market429
Designs. In Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI. Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and430
Version August 2, 2016 submitted to Games 17 of 17
Systems; Faratin, P.; Rodríguez-Aguilar, J.A., Eds.; Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005; Vol. 3435, Lecture Notes in431
Computer Science, pp. 101–114.432
19. Ponsen, M.; Tuyls, K.; Kaisers, M.; Ramon, J. An evolutionary game-theoretic analysis of poker strategies.433
Entertainment Computing 2009, 1, 39–45.434
20. Hennes, D.; Claes, D.; Tuyls, K. Evolutionary Advantage of Reciprocity in Collision Avoidance. Proc. of the435
AAMAS 2013 Workshop on Autonomous Robots and Multirobot Systems (ARMS 2013), 2013.436
21. Wellman, M.P.; Prakash, A. Empirical game-theoretic analysis of an adaptive cyber-defense scenario (preliminary437
report). In Decision and Game Theory for Security; Springer, 2014; pp. 43–58.438
22. Hennes, D.; Jong, S.D.; Tuyls, K.; Gal, Y.K. Metastrategies in large-scale bargaining settings. ACM Transactions439
on Intelligent Systems and Technology (TIST) 2015, 7, 10.440
23. Izzo, D. PYGMO AND PYKEP: OPEN SOURCE TOOLS FOR MASSIVELY PARALLEL OPTIMIZATION IN441
ASTRODYNAMICS (THE CASE OF INTERPLANETARY TRAJECTORY OPTIMIZATION). Technical report,442
Advanced Concept Team - European Space Research and Technology Centre (ESTEC), 2012.443
24. Liou, J.C.; Kessler, D.; Matney, M.; Stansbery, G. A new approach to evaluate collision probabilities among444
asteroids, comets, and Kuiper Belt objects. Lunar and Planetary Science Conference, 2003, Vol. 34, p. 1828.445
25. Vallado, D.A.; Crawford, P.; Hujsak, R.; Kelso, T. Revisiting spacetrack report #3. AIAA 2006, 6753, 2006.446
26. Johnson, N., L.; Krisko, P., H.; Liou, J.C.; Anz-Meador, P., D. Nasa’s new breakup model of EVOLVE 4.0. Adv.447
Space Res. Vol. 28, No. 9, pp. 1377-1384, Elsevier Science Ltd 2001.448
27. Klinkrad, H. Space debris; Wiley Online Library, 2010.449
28. Gibbons, R. A Primer in Game Theory; Pearson Education, 1992.450
29. Nash, J. Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics 1951, 54, 286–295.451
30. Novshek, W. On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium. The Review of Economic Studies 1985, 52, 85–98.452
31. Rodrigo Bamón, J.F. Existence of Cournot Equilibrium in Large Markets. Econometrica 1985, 53, 587–597.453
32. Dubey, P.; Haimanko, O.; Zapechelnyuk, A. Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games. Games454
and Economic Behavior 2006, 54, 77 – 94.455
33. Kukushkin, N.S. Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation. Games and Economic Behavior456
2004, 48, 94–110.457
34. Kukushkin, N.S. A fixed-point theorem for decreasing mappings. Economics Letters 1994, 46, 23–26.458
35. Kukushkin, N.S. Strategic supplements in games with polylinear interactions. Russian Academy of Sciences, mimeo459
2005.460
36. Weibull, J.W. Evolutionary game theory; MIT press, 1997.461
37. Bloembergen, D.; Tuyls, K.; Hennes, D.; Kaisers, M. Evolutionary Dynamics of Multi-Agent Learning: A Survey.462
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 2015, 53, 659–697.463
© 2016 by the authors. Submitted to Games for possible open access publication under the terms and conditions of the464
Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).465
